University of Miami Law Review
Volume 14

Number 3

Article 2

5-1-1960

The Metropolitan Special District: Intercounty Metropolitan
Government of Tomorrow
Robert W. Tobin

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr

Recommended Citation
Robert W. Tobin, The Metropolitan Special District: Intercounty Metropolitan Government of Tomorrow, 14
U. Miami L. Rev. 333 (1960)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol14/iss3/2

This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
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NUMBER 3

THE METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DISTRICT:
INTERCOUNTY METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
OF TOMORROW*
ROBERT W. TOBIN" *
INTRODUCTION

The time is fast approaching when the state legislatures will have to
devise an intercounty form of metropolitan government. The ever- expanding
geographic scope of metropolitan areas' has created a situation in which
state and county boundaries have failed to contain the outward push
from many a large central city.2 This mushrooming growth has rendered
intracounty methods of metropolitan government obsolete and has necessitated a new approach to metropolitan government. On an interstate level
certain compacts have already laid the groundwork for supracounty local
government ' and have furnished something of a model for intercounty
areas spanning two or more states. 4 However, on an intrastate level little
VThis is tile second part of a thesis being submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, in the Faculty of Law,
Columbia University.
*B.S.S., 1948; L.L.B., 1953; L.L.M., 1958.
1. 'Ihis expansion has been attested to by the United States Bureau of tile Census
which has called attention to the huge percentage growth in suburban population.
2 U.S. BUR. oF THE CENsUs, U.S. CENsus or POPULATION: 1950, pt. 1, p. 28 (1953). See
also BOLLENS, TIE SPATES AND THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM 10 (Council of State

Governments, Chicago, 1956).
2. Approximately 54 out of 174 standard metropolitan areas in the United States
are intercounty in scope. BOLLENS, Op. cit. suopra note 1, at 12. Of these 54 intercounty
metropolitan areas some 24 cross state lines. BOLLENS, OP. cit. supra note 1, at 14.
3. E.g., the compact changing the Delaware River Joint Commission to the
Delaware River Port Authority (Philadelphia-Casnden area) consented to in Act of
July 17, 1952, 66 Stat. 738 (1952); the compact establishing the Bi-State Development
Agency and the Bi-Statc Metropolitan District (St. Louis-East St. Louis area) consented
to in Resolution of August 30. 1950, 64 Stat. 568 (1950); the Port of New York
Authority compact (New York-Northern New Jersey area) consented to in Resolution
of August 23, 1921, 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
4. The Port of New York Authority has long been held up as a model of
interstate cooperation, but as far as metropolitan problems are concerned, it may be
supplanted as a model by the Bi-State Development Agency in tile St. Louis area since
the latter is empowered to perfonn more functions.
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has been done to cope with the problem of the intercounty metropolitan
community, an omission which is regrettable in view of the increasing
importance of the problem.
At present approximately 30 of the 174 standard metropolitan areas
in the United States are intercounty, but intrastate.5 These thirty areas
are located in eighteen states O and include such large population centers
as Los Angeles, San Francisco, Denver, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland and
Pittsburgh. Nineteen of these areas span only two countiesj but six
cover three counties,8 three cover four counties,9 one covers five counties,10
and one covers six counties." In short, the census statistics show that
the intercounty intrastate metropolitan area is a significant factor in
the demographic pattern of American life.
Unfortunately, advances in local government lag considerably behind
changes in patterns of population growth. As yet, little consideration has
been given to the fact that intercounty metropolitan areas do not have
many effective means of achieving area-wide governmental integration. This
paper attempts to illustrate the unique ability of the metropolitan special
district to satisfy the needs of the intercounty intrastate metropolitan areas
and considers the constitutional and legal problems which might present
obstacles to the creation of such a supracounty unit of local government.
TnE CASE FOR EMPLOYING TiE METROPOLITAN SPECIAL DISTRcr

IN THE INTERCOUNTY METROPOLIS

Students of local government have never been fond of
However, they have recognized that there are instances
districts can be of great utility, especially when political
the power of cities and counties to meet area-wide and

special districts.' 2
in which special
boundaries limit
regional needs.1

5. Derived from census data on standard metropolitan areas. 2 U.S. BUR. Or T1iE
POPULATION: 1950, pt. 1, p. 66, Table 26 (1953).
6. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mary-

CENsUs, U.S. CFNsns o

land, Massachussctts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, Vest Virginia.

7. Amarillo, Bridgeport, Buffalo, Charleston (\V. Va.), Cleveland, Dayton, Harris-

burg, Johnstown, Los Angeles, Macon, New Britain-Bristol, Peoria, Tampa-St. Petersburg,
Utica-Rome, Waterbury, Baltimore, Richmond, Norfolk-Portsmouth and Roanoke contain
both counties and separated cities within their respective areas, but since noie contain
more than two counties they are listed here.
8. Atlanta, Brockton, Detroit, Knoxville, New Orleans, Albany-Schenectady-Troy.
9. Minneapolis-St. Paul, Denver, Pittsburgh.
10. Boston.

I. San Francisco.
12. For a critical analysis of the defects of special districts and public authorities,
see McLean, Use and Abuse of Authorities, 42 NAT'L MUNTe. R.v. 438 (1953); McLean,

Threat to Responsible Rule, 40 NATL MUmIc. REv. 411 (1951); Martin, Therefore is

the Name Babel, 40 NAT'I. Mumc. REv. 70 (1951);
Districts, 22 NAT'I. Mutic. REv. 544 (1933).

Portes, A Plague of Special

13. Even '[liosas H. Reed. a caustic critic of special districts, has conceded their

usefulness for Spanning political boundaries. REED, Ctrv Gntowinc PAINs 14 (National

Municipal League, New York, 1941 ).
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Vhen such jurisdictional limitations impede the solution of metropolitan
problems, a good case can be made for the use of metropolitan special
districts because it is in such situations that the advantages of the special
district begin to outweigh its disadvantages. The question to be answered
is whether the use of metropolitan special districts can be justified in the
case of the intercounty metropolis.
In order to make such an appraisal it is necessary to be cognizant
of the principal criticisms aimed at special districts. Among these criticisms
are the following: Special districts contribute to governmental inefficiency
and complexity by furnishing an added layer of government;' 4 they serve
as a subterfuge to circumvent constitutional debt limits;"' their head
officials are seldom elected and even where they are, the special district
so complicates governmental machinery that democratic control is rendered
ineffective;"' their creation leads to a competition with other units of local
government for tax sources and in borrowing;1 7 and lastly they enable city
and county governments to avoid their responsibilities by creating stop-gap
devices.'8
Much of the foregoing criticism has resulted from the cumulative
use of special districts in metropolitan areas. The existence of a variety
of independent special districts operating in the same areas can be
justifiably condemned since it leads to governmental irresponsibility and
disintegration.' 9 There can be no geographic excuse for such diffusion of
governmental power, and the creation of a number of intercounty special
districts would be indefensible. However, there is much to be said for the
use of the mutlifunctional special district in the intercounty metropolis.
Although the multifunctional special district has some of the same
defects as the one-function special district, the former is much more capable
of providing responsible integrated government. Under the multifunctional
special district, responsibility is focused, and popular control is made more
effective. Moreover, the cause of efficiency is greatly advanced. While it
is true that the multifunctional special district is inferior to certain other
methods of metropolitan government on an intracounty level,20 its
14. V. JoNEs, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

95-96

(University

of Chicago Press,

Chicago, 1942).
15. Ralph Fuchs, an early advocate of supracounty metropolitan districts, has
decried their use for the purpose of avoiding constitutional debt limits. Fuchs, Regional
Agencies for Metropolitan Areas, 22 WAsn. U.L.Q. 64, 77 (1936).
16. BOLLF.Ns, TimE PROBI.EM OF GOVERNrMiNT IN TIlE SAN FRANcIsco BAY REGION
123-25 (Bureau of Public Administration, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1948).
17. Id. at 123; for possible conflict in floating bond issues, see Nehemkis, The
Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14, 29-33 (1937).
18. RED, op. cit. supra note 13, at 14.
19. E.g., Chicago, Toledo and the East Bay section of the San Francisco area
contain three or more metropolitan special districts operating independently of one
another. BOLLENS, op. cit. supra note 1,at 120.
20. Even such an advocate of metropolitan special districts as Ralph Fuchs concedes
that county modernization and metropolitan federation may be superior on an intracounty
level. Fuchs, supra note 15, at 76.
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geographic flexibility gives it an advantage over alternative methods on
an intercounty level.
Since the foregoing opinion is based on the fact that the metropolitan
special district has geographic attributes which make it especially suitable
to the governmental needs of the intercounty metropolis, it is necessary
to buttress the opinion by illustration. This can only be done by examining
possible alternative methods and pointing out their geographical limitations.
It will be seen that most other methods are based on changes in city or
county government and that these methods suffer from the territorial
inadequacies of the entities upon which they are based.
Prominent among these alternative methods have been city-county consolidation and city-county separation. The latter device, now out of vogue
except in Virginia,"' has always been intracounty in scope22 and accentuates
metropolitan area problems by limiting the effective range of urban government.2 3 The former method, with the exception of its use in New York
City,24 has also been an intracounty device, generally based on merger of
city and county functions in favor of the city.2 5 Occasionally, however, the
converse has been true.26 In any event, methods of consolidation and
separation are not geographically suited to the bi-county or multi-county
metropolitan area.
Strengthening of the urban county is another standard method of
metropolitan government which is inadequate for the solution of intercounty
governmental problems. This patently intracounty device has often been

21. Virginia has elaborate machinery for separation and consolidation of its local
governments. See VA. Cone, § 15-162 to § 15-231:78 (1950). As a result, there are
over 20 independent cities in Virginia. WACER, COUNTY GOVERNMENT ACROSS THLE
NATION 355-56 (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1950).
22. City-county separation has been employed in )enver (Arapahoe County),
St. Louis (St. Louis County), San Francisco (San Matco Conty) and Baltimore
(Baltimore County). It also might be mentioned that Hlonolulu is an independent
city-county.
23. The shortsightedness of this method is indicated by the fact that both St. Louis
and San Francisco have made efforts to reconsolidatc with the counties from which
they were separated. A consolidation plan for St. Louis and St. Louis County was
defeated in 1926, the city voters approving and the county voters disapproving. A 1948
scheme for the consolidation of San Francisco and San Mateo County was also defeated.
For a commentary on the defeat of the reconsolidation plan in San Francisco, see
IBollens, They All Wanted to Stay Out, 37 NAT'L MuNIc. Re-v. 309 (1948).
24. New York City was created to span the five counties of New York, Richmond,
Kings, Queens and Bronx. County existence has been retained for limited purposes (eg.,
district attorneys and judges), but the city government is essentially unitary except for
the exercise of some functions by borough governments.
25. Aside from New York, this type of consolidation has occurred in Philadelphia
(Philadelphia County), Boston (Suffolk County), New Orleans (Orleans Parish) and
Baton Rouge (East Baton Rouge Parish). See generally Willmott, The Truth About
City-County Consolidation, 2 NIhAMS L.Q. 127 (1947).
26. 'ennessee has recently passed a statute which allows its four largest citiesChattanooga, Memphis, Knoxville and Nashville-to consolidate with their respective
Counties. "FNN. Cone AN. tit. 6, ch. 37 (Supp. 1959).
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tied up with constitutional amendments permitting county home rule27
or optional forms of county government, 28 but occasionally county reorganization has been effected by general statutes without benefit of explicit
constitutional authorityya These efforts to broaden the scope of the urban
county have been commendable, and it is probably true that the rejuvenated
urban county presents the best hope of integrated government for the
intracounty metropolitan area.a 0 However, even the best of intracounty
schemes is not suitable to the needs of the intercounty metropolis.
If the strengthening of the urban county can be rejected as geographically inadequate, the same can be said with more emphasis about such
city-oriented schemes as annexation of unincorporated land to the central
city, consolidation of adjacent cities, and the exercise of extraterritorial
power by the central city. Only the second-mentioned method purports to
bring about any important structural change, and although it might in rare
instances transcend county boundaries,35 it is rarely used due to the political
difficulties involved.32 Annexation, once an important method of city

expansion, 3 has, with a few exceptions,3 4 been rendered almost useless by
suburban incorporation and burdensome procedural requirements,3 6 and in

36
any event cross-country annexation is not often permitted. As for extra-

27. CAL. CONST. art XI, § 7 2;Mn. COsT. art. XI-A, § 1; Mo. Cors'r. art. VI,
§ 18a (for counties over 85,000 population); 011o CONsr. art. X, §§ 3, 4; Ti'F.
CONST. art. IX, § 3 (for counties over 62,000 population with 2/3 consent of legislature);
WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 4. By special amendments home rule has been permitted in
Dade County (Miami), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 11) and Jefferson Parish
(suburban New Orleans), Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3c).
28. GA. CONST. art. XI, § 2-7806; LA. CONsT. art. XIV. § 3 (no legislative action
taken); Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 9; MONT. CONST. art. XVI, § 7; N.Y. CONST. art. IX,
§ 2; N.D. CONST. art. X, § 170; OIO CONST. art. X, § 1 (no legislative action taken);

CoNsT. art. VI, § 9a; VA. CONST. art. VII, § 110.
29. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 5, ch. 15 (Supp. 1959); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 244.125,
244.130, 244.135 (1959), In states like Iowa and Minnesota, where little constitutional
reference ismade to county government, or in the New England states, where county
government is vestigial, or in states like Virginia and North Carolina, where constitutional
provisions give the legislature almost unlimited control over counties (VA. CONST.
art. VII, § 110; N.C. CoNsT. art. VII, § 13), specific constitutional grants of power
to allow optional forms of county government would hardly be necessary.
30. V. JONEs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 137-43.
31. E.g., in the peninsular section of Virginia around Newport News, there is a
consolidation trend involving independent cities.
32. V. Jones, The Organization of a Metropolitan Area, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 538,
ORE.

548 (1957).

33. From their respective dates of incorporation until 1900, Chicago grew from
10 to 190 square miles, Boston from 4V2 to 38 square miles, Pittsburgh from % to 28
to 61 square
square miles, Minneapolis from 8 to 53 square miles and St. Louis from
miles. MCKENZIE, THE METROI'OI.ITAN COMMUNITY 336-37 (McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
New York, 1933).
in Texas have virtually limitless power of expansion. Atlanta,
34. Hoine rule cities

Albuquerque and the larger cities of Arizona have also made large territorial gains through
annexation.
35. For an example of burdensome annexation procedure, see Onio Rsv. CODE ch.
709 (Baldwin

1953). The tendency of suburbs to incorporate has been motivated bv

In some states, however, steps have
a desire to avoid annexation by large central cities.
been taken to prevent such restrictive fringe incorporation. See, e.g., IowA COD. ANN.
§ 362.1 (Stipp. 1959).
36. BOLLENS, op. cit. supra note 1,at 28.
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territorial jurisdiction, the best that can be said of it is that it is used in
over half the states,3 7 but only in a rather limited fashion.3 8 Like the
other city-oriented methods, it adds political shortcomings to its territorial
limitations.89
Which of the standard methods then, if any, are geographically adaptable
to the intercounty metropolis? It would seem that there are but two, the
metropolitan federation and the use of intergovernmental arrangements. The
former method, however, has never lived up to its geographic potential and
is almost invariably thought of as an intracounty device.4 0 It is true that
the New York Borough system bears some resemblance to an intercounty
federation4 1 and that the Toronto Plan, the prototype of modern metropolitan federalism, 42 gives promise of transcending county lines,' 3 but it
has been more common for metropolitan federalism to be thought of as
a division of power between an urban county and its component municipalities. If a metropolitan federation were to diverge from this pattern and
become intercounty in scope, it would probably have to be tied to some
specially contrived district and would closely resemble a multifunctional
special district.44 It is therefore difficult to think of the intercounty metropolitan federation as a real alternative to the intercounty metropolitan
district.
This leaves but one standard method to be considered, the use of
intergovernmental arrangements. 45 This device has often been used on an

37. Woorav (ed.), l't FUTURE OF CrriT1s AND URBAN RE.DEVELOPMEr'r 530-31
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953).
38. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is usually not large in geographic scope; nor is it
large in functional scope, being primarily confined to matters of health and vice. For
example, Los Angeles and Chicago can inspect milk at its source; Omaha and Baltimore
have health quarantine powers within a 3-mile extraterritorial belt; Chicago can control
prostitution within a 3-mile radius outside of its limits; and Indianapolis has general
control over vice suppression within four miles of its limits. See V. JoNES, op. Cit. tupia
note 14, at 90-91,
39. For reference to these political shortcomings, see V. Jones, supra note 32, at 542.
40. E.g., the intracounty metropolitan federation in Dade County (Miami),
Florida,
federation for Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania.
. 41. and
The the
Newproposed
York boroughs (Bronx,
Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens and Richmond)
are roughly equivalent in geographic scope to the counties within New York City. 'These
boroughs perform a few important functions and their presidents serve on the Board
of Estimate, the city's,highcst legislative body. However, power is so centralized in the
city that the borough systen cannot be thought of as federal.
42, For a general description of this novel system, see Milner, The Aletropolitan
Toronto Plan, 105 U. PA. L. RF.v. 570 (1957).
43, At present the federation is within York County, but the official planning
area covers part of three counties. Id. at 572.
44, E.g., the "Nietropolitan Municipal Corporation" designed by the Washington
legislature is in effect an intercounty metropolitan federation, but it could also be tenied
a multifunctional special district. WAsH. REv. CODE cb. 35.58 (Supp. 1957).
45. fitergovernnental arrangements have often been used on an intracounty level
with a modernized urban county furnishing services by contract to cities (e.g., Los Angeles
County or a central city furnishing services to suburban areas by contract (e.g., Atlanta,
Ge
ri }.
"""
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intercounty level, particularly as between rural counties.46 In recent years
it has also been used by adjacent urban counties in the solution of joint
problems. For example, the metropolitan areas of Detroit,4 7 Denver, 4
Seattle,'4 and Northeastern Illinois (Chicago) 50 have intercounty schemes
in operation and recent Minnesota legislation is aimed at providing cooperation between urban couniies in that state.5 1 Unfortunately, intercounty
cooperation appears to be directed primarily at planning and gives little
indication of going beyond that point,5 2 and therefore the geographic potential of this method is virtually nullified by its narrow governmental scope.
As the foregoing survey indicates, the metropolitan special district has
a geographic advantage over the other standard methods of metropolitan
government in that it can provide a number of functions to a metropolis
without being unduly restricted by county or city boundaries. Moreover,
there does not appear to be any new approach by which governmental
integration could be extended over an intercounty metropolitan area. Conceivably a central county could expand its scope by consolidation with
adjacent counties, 5 3 annexation of contiguous metropolitan territory5 ' or by
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 15 However, in addition to the
political difficulties of such methods, there would be numerous constitu-

46. The rural counties of the southeastern states furnish examples of cooperation
on public health, public welfare, rural libraries and numerous other projects. None the
less, these joint ventures have been at best a partial solution to the basic inadequacy
of county government. WACER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 353.
47, Pursuant to MICH. ComP. LAws § § 123.641-123.645 (Supp. 1957) and Micir.
Comp. LAws ch. 252 (Supp. 1956) six counties in the Detroit area have formed an
intercounty highway committee and are undertaing an area study.
48. Denver has a tri-county planning committee (Denver County, Arapahoe County,
Adams County). WACER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 678.
49. Four counties in the Seattle area have formed an intercounty planning
cominision. 45 NAT'. MIUNc. REv. 453 (1956).
50. Pursuant to the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Planning Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 351-389 (1957), an intercounty planning commission has been
created in the populous northeastern sector of the state.
51, MINE. STAT. ANN. ch. 473 (\Vest, Supp. 1959).
52, See generally laar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA.
L. RFv. 515 (1957).
53, Although state constitutions usually permit consolidation the political obstacles
are great, particularly where the counties are legislative districts. The greatest obstacle
is the additional requirement in most instances, that the affected persons approve
consolidation by an affirmative vote. There are, therefore, few examples of county
consolidation in urban areas. Among these few examples are the 1919 consolidation of
James County with 1amilton County (Chattanooga, Tennessee) and the consolidation
of Milton and Campbell Counties with Fulton County (Atlanta, Georgia) around 1930.
54, Although the City and County of Denver has been accorded the power to
annex territory in adjoining counties without submitting the issue to a constitutionally
required vote (Simon v. Arapahoe County, 80 Colo. 445, 252 Pac. 811 (1927)), most
counties have to contend not only with the voting obstacles but also minimum population
and area requirements (e.g., Beaufort County v. Jasper County, 220 S.C. 469, 68 S.E.2d
421 (1951)). Alteration of county boundaries is therefore no easy task.
55. Extraterritorial power for counties runs counter to the concept of the county
as an administrative unit and would understandably cause great friction. See, e.g., Denver
v. Arapahoe County, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P.2d 101 (1945), in which the extraterritorial
power of the City and County of Denver was unsuccessfully questioned by an adjoining
county.
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tional impediments such as: minimum area and population requirements,56

57
boundary alteration provisions requiring a vote by the persons affected,
clauses necessitating reallocation of debts as between the new and old
governmental units,"8 clauses making the county unit a legislative or judicial
district,"9 and clauses describing subdivisions within counties.60 It is therefore obvious that there are almost insurmountable constitutional obstacles
to the geographic growth of urban counties and that the metropolitan special
district provides the best solution to the territorial problem of the
intercounty metropolis.
rIIE CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO LEGISLATIVE CREATION OF INTERCOUNTY
METROPOLITAN I)ISTRICTS

If it is to be assumed that the multifunctional special district is the
answer to the needs of the intercounty metropolis, the question arises
as to the legislative power to create such a novel unit of government.
Although state legislatures theoretically have the power to create, dissolve
6
and alter local governments at will, ' this power is subject to the restrictions

of organic law.6 2 Consequently the creation of intercounty metropolitan
districts could conceivably run afoul of a number of constitutional clauses.
Fortunately special districts are less intertwined with the fundamental law
of the several states than are the traditional units of local government,"
56. Many states have such provisions in their constitutions (Arkansas,

California,

Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Carolina).
Such provisions greatly impede the attempts of one county to expand at the expense
of a neighboring county as well as the attempts to divide one county into two or to
effect citycnunty separation. For an extensive legal analysis of the application of minimum
area and population requirements to city-county separation, see generally Rusn, TiE
CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATED (The author, Los Angeles, 1941).
57. As a rule both alterations of county boundaries and outright consolidation must
be accompanied by an assenting vote. E.g., ,io. Corsr. art. VI, §§ 4, 5; CA. COrcST.
art. XI, §§ 2-7804, 2-7805. See also Ilines v. Etheridge, 173 Ca. 870, 162 S.. 13
(1931), in which the consolidation of Campbell County with Fulton County (Atlanta)
was challenged for lack of compliance with constitutional voting requirements.
58. Changing county boundaries invariably raises questions of debt reallocation.
Los Angeles County v. Orange County, 97 Cal. 329, 32 Pac. 316 (1893); Pinellas
County v. Ilillsborough County, 70 Fla. 504, 70 So. 558 (1915). These cases involved
the separation of Orange County from Los Angeles County and the separation of Pinellas
County from Ilillsborough County, moves which have proven to be shortsighted in
view of the metropolitan growth in both areas.
59. In State v. Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 225 Pac. 1007 (1924), it was alleged that
a city-county consolidation plan interfered with judicial and legislative districts, One
big reason for the failure of counties to consolidate has been the fact that counties have
been tied to legislative apportionment, thereby discouraging incumbent legislators from
tampering with the political status quo. WACER, Op. cit. suPra note 21, at 352.

60. Michigan is constitutionally tied to an intracounty system of townshin govern-

ment. MICH, CONST. art. VIII,

§

2.

61. I NIcQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 509-510 (3d ed. 1949).
62. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).
63. There are very few explicit constitutional references to metropolitan special
districts (e.g., MInH. CONST. art. VIII, § 31; Mo. CONST. art VI, § 30a), but these are.
of course, references to special districts in general. E.g., CAL. CO4sT. art. XI, § 20 (debt
limitations on districts of all kinds) and TE.X. CONST. art. XVI, § 59 (dealing with
creation of all kinds of special districts).
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and thus direct legislative control over special districts is not seriously
circumscribed.

By way of illustrating the enviable constitutional status of the metropolitan special district, one need only refer to the numerous instances in
which other methods of metropolitan government have been the subjects
of constitutional amendments. Changes in the structure of the urban
county have produced a number of amendments, 6 4 as have schemes for
city-county consolidation,6 5 city-county separation 66 and metropolitan federation.671 Moreover the Missouri Constitution has provided for a wide variety
of metropolitan government methods in the St. Louis area.66
Ironically enough, the foregoing amendments have not stilled constitutional challenges to the various schemes involved. In general these
challenges have proceeded on the theory that the amendments were not
passed in accordance with the amending procedure of the constitution,
In this regard three main points have been raised: (1) the amendment
covered more than one subject; 19 (2) the amendment was in fact a
general constitutional revision and had to be passed by a different procedure;70 (3) the amendment was improperly passed by the state legislature.lt
However, some suits have gone beyond these narrow grounds and have
apparently been based on the illogical theory that the amendment was
substantively unconstitutional.7 2 Despite the inherent contradiction in such
a theory, there are at least two important cases in which a court chose
to treat such an amendment as inferior to other portions of organic law
64. See notes 27, 28 supra.

65. CAL. CONsr. art. X1, § 7; GA. CONST. art, XI, § 2-7807; Mo. CorcsT. art. VI,
§ 17; MoNT. CONST. art. XVI, § 7; N.M. CoNsT. art. X, §4; TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 9;
\VAsn. CoNsT. art. XI, § 16. Moreover, Florida has special consolidation amendments
for Duval and Monroe counties (FLA. CoNrsT. art. VIIi, § 9, 10); Louisiana has a
special consolidation amendment for Baton Rouge (LA. Co NsT. art. XIV, § 3a);
Pennsylvania has a special consolidation amendment for Philadelphia PA. CONST. art.
XIV, § 8).
66. Mico. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MrNN. CONST. art. XI, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. VI,
§ 17. See also special separation provisions of Colorado Constitution applying to Denver.
COLO. CONST.

art. XX.

67. FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 11 (Dade County); PA. CONST. art. XV, § 4
(Alleghcny County). Th Ohio legislature, by a point resolution of May 29, 1957
(Ohio Laws 1957, p, 113), proposed two amendments to Onto CoNsT. art. X, §§ 5, 6,
dealing with metropolitan federation, but the Ohio voters rejected the "metropolitan
federation" amendments in the 1958 general elections.
68. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 30a.
69. Cray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1956) (attack on Dade County home
rule amendment); State v. City of Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So.2d 477 (1949)
(attack on Baton Rouge consolidation amendment); State v. Cooney, supra nqte 59
(attack on amcndment permitting city-ocunty consolidation between Silver Bow County
and Butte, Montana).
70. State v. Cooney, minpra note 59.
71. People v. Sours, 31 Colo 369, 74 Pac. 167 (1903) (attack on Denver home
rule amendment); Lucas v Berkett, 233 La. 896, 98 So.2d 229 (1957).
72. People v. Horan, 34 Colo. 304, 86 Pac. 252 (1905); People v. Johnson, 34
Colo. 143, 86 Pac. 233 (1905); State v. City of Baton Rouge, supra note 69 (the
Louisiana amendment on consolidation in East Baton Rouge Parish left changes in
function, as opposed to changes in structure, subject to general and organic law); State
v. Cooney, supra note 59.
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and thus completely limited by them.73 Although these holdings were
subsequently overruled,7 4 they stand as a monument to the fact that
constitutional amendments do not necessarily quiet legal objections to
changes in local governmental structure. It is to the advantage of metropolitan special districts that they can usually be created without changes
in organic law.
It must not be thought, however, that state legislatures have an
absolutely free hand in regard to metropolitan special districts. Such entities
have points of contact with city and county government, and a state
legislature cannot create a special district in such a way that it will impinge
upon the constitutionally ordained structure of local government. This
would be particularly true as regards the relationship between metropolitan
special districts and counties.
For example, in creating an intercounty metropolitan district a state
legislature would have to be aware of the rights and prerogatives of
constitutional county officers. With very few exceptions,"7 state constitutions
make reference to a number of county officers and therefore enshrine them
as constitutional officers.76 These provisions are in many cases a legacy of
the Jacksonian era in which great stress was laid on democratic election
of county officials and their protection against arbitrary removal by state
officials. 77 However commendable these provisions might have been in
changing state-dominated, oligarchic county structure,7 8 they represent a
possible roadblock to the creation of an intercounty metropolitan special
district.
County officials are understandably jealous of their power, and they
have been at the center of much constitutional controversy over attempts
to streamline urban government at their expense. In New York, attacks
were directed against county manager government for Monroe County on
the ground that the constitutional powers of the county board of supervisors were being usurped;79 in Virginia the Henrico county (Richmond)
governing body refused to give way to a new commission-manager government, invoking various constitutional grounds to justify its desire to serve
73. People v. loran, suTOa note 72; People v. Johnson, supra note 72.
74. People v. Curtice, 50 Colo. 503, 117 Pac. 357 (1911). This case was cited
in State v. Cooney, su/ra note 59, as authority for the proposition that newly passed
constitutional amendments, however novel they may seem, stand on the same footing
as other parts of organic law and must be considered to override conflicting sections of
constitutional law since they represent a recent expression of popular will.
75. E.g., Ohio, Rhode Island.
76. For a somewhat dated list of state constitutional provisions referring to county
officers, see 11. P. Jones, Constitutional Barriers to Improvement in County Government,
21 NAT'L MUmIc. Rrv. 525, 537-539 (1932).
77. V. Jox-s, op. cit. supra note 14, at 222; VAGER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 345.
78. Jacksonian democracy had its biggest effect in the south where state-appointed
county officials formed tight-knit oligarchies and where there was no democratic tradition
of town government to offset the county or moderate its undemocratic features.
79. Cort v. Smith, 249 App. Div. 1, 291 N.Y. Supp. 54, aff'd, 273 N.Y. 481,
6 N.E.2d 414 (1936).
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its full term and to appoint the new county manager;80 in Missouri the
attorney-general launched a quo warranto attack against the police superintendent and board of police commissioners of St. Louis county, challenging
their right to displace the county sheriff; 8' in Florida the sheriff of Dade
82
County (Miami) refused to give way to a metropolitan safety director;
in Louisiana the police jury of Jefferson parish (suburban New Orleans)
waged a long and bitter fight against a new commission form of government;813 in Nebraska constitutional objection was made to the appointive
powers of a proposed county manager for Douglas county (Omaha); 8 4 and
in Pennsylvania an amendment had to be added to the state constitution
in 1951 to root out county officers who had grimly clung to their posts
in Philadelphia despite the long-standing city-county merger in that area.",
Although metropolitan special districts do not normally encroach on constitutional county officers to the extent of provoking such litigation, state
legislatures must be aware of the constitutional position of county officeholders in creating metropolitan special districts.
In addition to possible entanglements with county office-holders, state
legislatures must consider other constitutional threats to the formation of
an intercounty metropolitan district. A legislative draftsman might well
explore the state constitution asking the following questions: Are there
provisions which would prevent the state legislature from using special
legislation to create a metropolitan district for a specific intercounty
metropolis? Are there local autonomy provisions which would pose a threat
to a local supergovemment? Are there clauses requiring uniform county
government or uniformity in taxation, and if so, how might these apply to an
intercounty metropolitan district? Are there implied constitutional prohibitions on the creation of unique units of local government, and even if
there are not, are there implied prohibitions on the delegation of certain
legislative powers, particularly the taxing power, to such a novel entity?
Are there constitutional debt and tax limitations, as well as other fiscal
provisions, which would impose impossible financial restrictions on a new
district?
Of the foregoing questions only one goes to the heart of the legislative
power to create an intercounty metropolitan district, namely the question
80. Lipscomb v. Nuckols, 161 Va. 936, 172 S.E. 886 (1934).
81. State v. Gamble, 365 Mo. 215, 280 S.V.2d 656 (1955).
82. Dade County v. Kelly, 99 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1958).
83. Ladnier v. Molere, 230 Lo. 784, 89 So.2d 301 (1956), in which the police
jury had special law pertaining to commission government in Jefferson Parish declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it did not offer optional forms of county government

as required by the Louisiana Constitution. Subsequently the Louisiana Constitution was
amended LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3c) to allow a change in the government of
Jefferson Parish. This amendment was challenged by the police jury but without
success. Lucas v. Berkett, supra note 71.
84. State v. Tusa, 130 Neb. 528, 265 N.W. 524 (1936).
85. PA. CONST. art XIV, § 8. See also Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d
834 (1953), in which the Pennsylvania judiciary was called upon to decide the fate of

county officials in the light of the new amendment.
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raising the possibility of an implied constitutional prohibition on the
creation of a unique unit of local government. This point has been raised
against intercounty metropolitan districts before,86 but it has seldom won
judicial favor since it is based on the assumption that state constitutions
are grants of power rather than limitations upon power.87 The theory
underlying such suits is that the state legislature can create only those
local governments which are authorized by the constitution. This is a
rather weak theory and does not appear to pose a real threat to the creation
of intercounty metropolitan districts. 88
Furthermore it does not appear that the constitutional points raised
in the first two questions seriously endanger the legislative power over the
creation of intercounty metropolitan districts. The "special legislation"
provisions of state constitutions differ a great deal,8 9 but none seem to
constitute a real roadblock to the creation of intercounty metropolitan
districts by special legislation. Although the passage of special acts on
the subject of metropolitan special districts has occasionally made it
90
difficult for courts to uphold the constitutionality of the legislation, this
type of constitutional objection has not prevented the creation of a
number of metropolitan special districts by means of special act."1 Moreover
it does not seem that "local autonomy" provisions will pose any more of
2
a threat than do the constitutional restrictions on special legislation., The
real obstacle posed by "local autonomy" clauses is political because they

86. leiser v. Metropolitan Bd. of Health, 37 N.Y. 661 (1865); People v. Draper,
15 N.Y. 532 (1857). The same type of challenge was directed at the interstate Port
of New York Authority. City of New York v. Willcox, 115 Misc. 351, 189 N.Y.
Supp. 724 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
87. For an apparent judicial acceptance of this theory, see People v. Becker,
203 N.Y. 201,96 N.E. 381 (1911).
88. It is accepted almost without question that a state needs no specific constitutional authorization to reshape its subdivisions. 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
509-510 (3d ed. 1949).
89. About two-thirds of the states have this type of constitutional provision. Some
provisions pertain to grants of special privileges, immunities or franchises (e.g., IND.
CONST. art. I, § 23); other provisions pertain to the prohibition of special legislation
for certain enumerated purposes (e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25); some provisions
prevent special legislation where general laws could be made applicable (e.g., ILL. CoNsT.
art. IV, § 22, last para.); still other provisions prevent local laws without prior public
notice (e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 8); and there are also provisions requiring
that general laws must be uniform in application (e.g., IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23).
90. Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors, 300 Mich. 1,
I N.W.2d 430 (1942); Wilson v. Board of Trustees of the Sanitary Dist. of Chicago,
133 Ill. 443, 27 N.E. 203 (1891).
91. E.g., the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commision (Boston), the Baltimore County Metropolitan District, the Minneopolis-St. Paul Sanitary District. The
Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, the Port of New York Authority, the
Washington Suburban Sanitation Commission and the Metropolitan Transit District
(Boston).
92. For examples of local autonomy provisions being invoked against metropolitan
special districts, see Robertson v. Zimmeruan, 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935);
City of Lehi v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237. 48 P.2d 530 (1935).
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encourage a parochial viewpoint that is incompatible with broad concepts
of metropolitan government 8
Of more interest is the constitutional point raised in the third question
pertaining to uniform county 'governmnt. Where such "uniformity" clauses
exist,94 or are implied by the courts, 5 they not only endanger county
modernization 6 but any method of metropolitan government which affects
county structure.9 7 Although practical necessity dictates that urban areas
should be allowed to transform a mode of government designed for a
simple agricultural society, conservativ6 courts have sometimes invoked
"uniformity" clauses to invalidate needed changes in county government.,,
Where such clauses are contained in a state constitution, their possible
effect on intercounty metropolitan government must be carefully weighed
by a state legislature.
Of even more significance than the "uniformity" problem is the question
of a state legislature's power to delegate certain functions to an intercounty
metropolitan district. The question of delegating power to local governments has often arisen in regard to the strengthening of urban counties,
and frequent constitutional objections have been raised to the legislative
grant of municipal-type powers to counties, e.g., planning and zoning, 9
rezoning, 100 legislating10 1 and the owning and operating of transportation
terminals. 0 2 Unlike the county, the intercounty metropolitan district will
93. Although the home rule movement is sometimes linked with metropolitan
government because it originated as part of the St. Louis metropolitan plan of 1875,
a recent report on intergovemmental relations was emphatic in its assertion that
home rule has been a roadblock to metropolitan government. 3 U.S. COA1M'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

54 (June, 1955).
94. E.g., GA. CONST. art. XI, § 2-7806; Mo. Co NsT. art. VI, § 8 (allows for four
classifications of countries with uniformity in each class); NEv. CONST. art IV, § 26;
WASh. CONST. art. XI, § 4; \Vis. CONST. art. IV, § 23.

95. Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949).
96. The principle of uniform county government has been invoked in the following
cases involving county modernization: State v. Kiburz, 357 Mo. 309, 208 S.W.2d 285
(1948); McDonald v. Beemer. 67 Nev. 419, 220 P.2d 217 (1950); Gaud v. Walker,
sulra note 95; State v. Radcliffe, 216 Wis. 356, 257 N.W. 171 (1934).
97. The uniformity principle has been used to plague large cities separated from
their counties. In Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 316, 46 Pac. 87 (1896), a constitutional
clause on uniform county government (CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 4, repealed in 1933)
was used to rebut the argument that there should be no county officers in San Francisco;
in People v. Johnson, supra note 72, the Colorado court, without relying on an explicit
uniformity provision, forced the city of Denver to maintain in office the same set of
county officials as found in other areas in the state; in State v. City of St. Louis, 356
Mo. 820, 204 S.W.2d 234 (1947), it was held that the municipal assembly of St. Louis
had to perform functions normally carried out by county governing bodies in the rest
of the state.

98. Gaud v. Walker, supra note 95; State v. Radcliffe, supra note 96.
99. Mogilner v. Metropolitan Planning Comm'n, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E.2d 220
(1957); Oursler v. Board of Zoning Appeals Baltimore County, 204 Md. 397, 104 A.2d
568 (1953); State v. Loesch, 350 Mo. 989, 169 S.W.2d 675 (1943).
100. Kirkpatrick v. Candler, 205 Ga. 449, 53 S.E.2d 889 (1949).
101. State v. Loesch, sujra note 99; Gaud v. Walker, suora note 95.
102. State v. Board of Comm'rs of Cuyahoga County, 83 Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d
694, Odpal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948).
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probably not encounter much constitutional opposition on the question of
planning or the performance of any proprietary service, since both have
been considered a normal function of metropolitan special districts. However, there may be considerable constitutional furor over the delegation of
certain basic governmental powers to an intercounty metropolitan district,
particularly if its governing body is not directly elected or composed of
elected city and county officials. Already there have been a host of cases
challenging the delegation of taxing powers to metropolitan special districts
with non-elective governing bodies, 10 3 and although this theory of suit
has not been well-received by the courts,' 0 4 it-indicates a source of constitutional attack of which legislatures must be aware in creating intercounty
metropolitan districts.
In addition to the problem of delegating taxing power, legislatures will
have to consider a variety of related fiscal problems stemming from state
constitutional provisions. For example, there is the important questions of
tax collection and tax assessment procedure. Even if it is assumed that
intercounty metropolitan districts can be granted the taxing power, it does
not follow that they can usurp the functions of county tax collectors or
county tax assessors, particularly if the latter are elected officials or
constitutional officers.'10 In all probability intercounty commissions will
rely on county tax assessors, tax collectors and treasurers to gather and
keep track of their tax revenues.100 Although this will avoid serious political
and constitutional problems, it still will not provide uniformity of taxation
throughout a metropolitan area.' 07 Intereounty commissions, in the abscence
of state equalization boards, 05 must be given power to equalize assessment
differences between their component counties, at least for the purpose of
metropolitan taxation.10 9
103. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California v. Burney, 215 Cal. 582,
11 P.2d 1095 (1932): Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308,
5 P.2d 585 (1931); Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, supra
note 90; State v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 166 N.E. 407 (1929),
af'd, 281 U.S. 74 (1930); City of Lehi v. Meiling, supra note 92.
104, One rare instance in which a court accepted this theory was in the case of Van
Cleve v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'n, 71 N.J.L. 574, 60 At]. 214 (1905).
105. In Florida, for example, county tax assessors and county tax collectors are constitutional officers who must be elected. FLA. Co.,sT. art. \il1, § 6. See also CoLo. CONST.

art. XIxr, § 8.

106. This is the system provided by the Washington Legislature for a "Metropolitan
Municipal Corporation." NVAsIs. REv. CODE, ch. 35.58 (Stpp. 1957).
107. See, e.g., Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v. Boards of Supervisors,

304 Mich. 328, 8 N.W.2d 84 (1943), in which an intercounty metropolitan district could
not decide on a uniform method of assessment for its five component counties and threw
the problem into the courts.
108. Arkansas, California, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio and Pennsylvania are among the states having some tax equalization authority on
a state level.
109. There are constitutional manadates on unformity of taxation (e.g., CoLo. CoNsT.
art. X, § 3; h.L. CONST. art. IX, § 9) which might require some attempts at tax equalization by a metropolitan government. In his article on metropolitan special districts
Ralph Fuchs placed emphasis on the necessity of such a method of promoting equal
distribution of the tax burden. Fuchs, supra note 15, at 75.
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Another important fiscal problem stems from constitutional limitations
on the power of local governments to incur debt and levy taxes. Debt
limitations have primary application to municipal corporations, 110 but they
also apply to counties"' and occasionally to special districts. 112 Due to the
fact that metropolitan special districts have often been viewed by the
courts as municipal corporations," a they have occasionally been made
subject to municipal debt limitations.14 Vhere such constitutional restrictions have been applied to metropolitan special districts, their debt has
been computed separately from the debts of municipal corporations within
the district. 15 This latter fact is just one of the fiscal considerations which
must be taken into account in the creation of intercounty metropolitan
districts.
Closely related to constitutional debt limitations are clauses restricting
the taxing power of local governments. The Washington legislature has
provided a recent example of the effects of such tax limitations upon
the creation of metropolitan special districts. The "Metropolitan Municipal
Corporation" authorized by the Washington legislature was squarely faced
by a constitutional tax limit which prohibited state and local taxation on
personal and real property in excess of 40 mils without the consent of
three-fifths of the voters in an election." 0 Since the full millage rate had been
reached in some urban areas, the statute permitting the creation of new
metropolitan districts had to include a provision on voter approval for
a one mil excess of the tax limit." 7 It is fiscal constitutional problems
of this nature that will hamper the legislative power to create a metropolitan
special district for an intercounty metropolis.
However, it is to be hoped that state legislatures will have sufficient
constitutional leeway to create or to permit the creation of intercounty
metropolitan districts possessed of the power to provide equalization of
services over a whole area and to reach important tax sources which could
110. Municipal debt limitations are a result of the post-Civil XVar boom which saw
many towns and cities overextend themselves financially, particularly in their largesse
to railroads. Two main kinds of municipal debt limitations were framed, the first forbidding
aid to or the acquisition of stock in private corporations and the second limiting municipal
debt to a certain percentage of the assessed value of taxable property. Williams &
Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations,
37 COLuM. L. REV. 177 (1937).
111. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX § 12; CoLo. CONsT. art. XI, § 6.
112. E.g., CAL. CON T. art. XI, § 20.
113. Rash v. Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Dist., 309 Ky. 442, 217
S.W.2d 232 (1949); Kocsis v. Chicago Park Dist., 362 Ill. 24, 198 N.E. 847 (1935);
Wilson v. Board of Trustees of Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, supra note 90; Paine v. Port of
Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 127 Pac. 580 (1912).
114. City of Indianapolis v. Buckner, 233 Ind. 32, 116 N.E.2d 507 (1954); Paine
v. Port of Seattle, supra note 113. See also Tobin, The Legal and Governmental Status
of the Metropolitan Special District, 13 U. MIAXI L. REV. 129, 132-33 (1958).
115 Ibid.
116. WASH. CoNsr. art. VII, § 2.
117. WAsH. REv. CODE § 35.58.090 (Supp. 1957).
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benefit a whole metropolitan area by paying their fair share.11 8 As things
stand now, many metropolitan areas display a gross inequality in taxes
and services from section to section." 9 Somehow metropolitan governments
must step into the picture and eliminate the more exaggerated effects of
fiscal balkanization. This does not necessarily mean absolute uniformity in
all area-wide services, since it may be desirable to create taxing districts which
differentiate between the more urbanized and less urbanized areas, 20 but
it does mean that some brand of financial order must be imposed in order
to end a chaos of inequality and deprivation in the midst of plenty.. 21
Such order is particularly essential to the intercounty metropolis since it
overlaps so many local governments.
THE POLITICS OF INTERCOUNTY METROPOLITAN QOVERNMENT

No matter how fine a plan of metropolitan government may appear to
political scientists and lawyers, it is worth little if it is not politically
acceptable. There are some governmental purists who insist on no compromise with the whims of the electorate, 22 but in the final analysis it is the
metropolitan area voters who must accept or reject a given plan of metropolitan government, provided, of course, that the legislature permits a
referendum rather than arbitrarily imposing a special district upon a
metropolis.1 23 The experience of decades has shown that citizens of a
metropolis do not take easily to drastic changes in the familiar institutions
118. Victor Jones points out that city dwellers dislike paying taxes for the purpose
of building and providing services in less settled areas of a metropolis. He also notes that
rich suburbs are loath to help a run-down central city. V. JONEs, op. cit. suPra note 14,
at ch. VII. Consequently metropolitan areas have deteriorating areas existing alongside
of rich tax sources. Chicago, for example, cannot tax many big industries outside its
limits but within its metropolitan area, with the result that federal money must be sought.
2 U. S. COMNI'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPOR'
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 25 (June, 1955).
119. BOLLENS, otj. Cit. supra note I, at 2 0-21 V. Jom.s, op. cit. supra note 14, at
ch. VII.
120. The Baton Rouge plan, in addition to urbanized and non.urbanized tax districts,
also provided for an industrial district. Any metropolitan plan which allows for two or
more districts must contend with constitutional provisions on uniformity of taxation.
This was a minor point in the test case against Baton Rouge consolidation. See State v.
City of Baton Rouge, supra note 69.
121. "The metropolitan areas are the great reservoirs of wealth and population,
but they are the simultaneous builders of slums and possessors of needy persons-a Dr.
Jekyll in wealth, a Mr. Hyde in needs." 2 U.S. COMMI'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, ADVISORY CoxIiTTrE REPORT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 24-25 (June, 1955).
122. Thomas 11. Reed has expressed the view that it is better to suffer defeat with
a good sound plan than to compromise. He has stated that special districts, even multifunctional special districts like the Boston Metropolitan District, hinder true progress
toward metropolitan government. Reed, The Metropolitan Problem, 30 NAT'L MUNIC.
REv. 400-408, 460 (1941).
123. Usually legislatures are not bound to allow a popular vote ofl the creation of
special districts, and a number of important metropolitan special districts have been
created without a referendum. E.g., the Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission
(Boston), the Baltimore County Metropolitpn District, the Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary
District, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, the Port of New York
Authority, the Washington Subrban Sanitary Commission, the Metropolitan Transit
District (Boston).
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of local government and that they like their metropolitan government in
small doses. It has also been demonstrated that local politicians can present
formidable opposition to any plan of metropolitan government which
threatens to undercut their position. From a political point of view it
almost seems that genuine intercounty metropolitan government must be
12
brought in gradually through the back door. '
If the foregoing opinion seems unduly cynical, one need only refer
to the sorry political history of city-county consolidation movements. Citycounty consolidation, one of the most drastic and most frequently proposed
methods of metropolitan government, has been considered and discarded
in many areas. 125 Where political action has actually been undertaken,
defeat has almost invariably followed. These defeats have taken place in
state legislatures, 26 in state-wide votes on constitutional amendments 127 or
in local elections. 128 Only the successful 1947 consolidation of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, and East Baton Rouge Parish stands out as a significant exception
1 20
to a general pattern of failure.
In addition, schemes for metropolitan federation have also had tough
political sledding,1 30 despite the fact that the federation device is a much
more moderate method of metropolitan government than city-county consolidation.1 3' There are again exceptions to the general history of defeat,
for example, the successful federation plan for Dade County (Miami),
124. This idea of gradually imposing metropolitan government on a suspicious but
lethargic electorate has been often expressed. BOLLENS, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 122-23;
Fuchs, suopra note 15, at 73-74; Cottrell &Jones, Is Integration Possible?, in METROPOLITAN
Los ANGELEs-A STUDY IN INTEGRATION 81-82 (The Haynes Foundation, Los Angeles,
Cal., 1955).
125. Atlanta, Austin, Charlotte, Durham, Houston, San Antonio, Toledo. BOLLENS,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 71.
126. King County (Seattle) 1923, Ramsey County (St. Paul) 1924, Cuyahoga County
1925, Jackson County (Kansas City, Mo.) 1933, Wyandotte County (Kansas
City, Kan.) 1937, Milwaukee County 1937. BOLLENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72.
127. Multanomah County (Portland, Oregon) 1927, Jefferson County (Birmingham)
1936 and 1948, Jefferson County (Louisville) 1937. In 1948 Dade County, Florida
voters had an opportunity to decide if a plan consolidating Miami, Dade County and
four villages should be submitted to a state-wide vote. The proposal was defeated.
BOLLENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72.
128. St. Louis--St. Louis County 1926, Newport News-Warwick County-Elizabeth
City County 1950 (later modified consolidation attempts were successful in 1952 and
1958), Bibb County (Macon, Georgia) 1933, Duval County (Jacksonville) 1935, Dade
County (Miami) 1953 (later federation attempt successful). BOLLENS, Op. Cit. Suprd
note 1, at 72. Recently the proposed consolidation of Davidson County and Nashville,
Tennessee, was rejected by the voters. 47 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 399 (1958).
129. For a brief description of the Baton Rouge plan, see 36 NAT'L MUNic. REV.
413 (1947). For a commentary on its accomplishments, see Kean, Consolidation That
Works, 45 NAT'L MUNIC. REV. 478 (1956).
130. Local voters turned down a federal type plan for Alemeda County (Oakland) in
1916 and a similar plan in 1922. Local voters rejected federation in Allegheny County
(Pittsburgh) in 1929. Two federation bills for the Boston area were turned down by the
Massachusetts legislature in 1931. In 1930 the Missouri electorate turned down a constitutional amendment allowing St. Louis and St. Louis County to draft a federation charter.
BOLLENS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87.
131. Federation is, in effect, a partial city-county consolidation which does not require
that either city or county surrender its identity.
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Florida, in 1957.132 However, the Dade County success followed upon the
defeat of several other plans of metropolitan government 3 3 and was greatly
facilitated by the fact that only a county-wide majority was needed. t 34
The lessons to be learned from the political failures of the past are
plain. In the first place, voters are not likely to accept the complete and
immediate establishment of a full-blown metropolitan government. Gradualism, not abruptness, is called for. Secondly, local politicians must somehow
be placated without yielding on the basic principles of metropolitanism.
Thirdly, elections involving multiple majorities should be avoided if at all
possible. They entail almost certain defeat.
The first of the aforementioned lessons ties in with the earlier averment
that metropolitan government must be ushered in the back door. This
means that proponents of intercounty metropolitan districts should not
expect voters to approve schemes which integrate all area-wide functions
at once. 35 Sounder strategy calls for a more moderate approach, one by
which only a few area-wide functions are transferred to a new intercounty
commission. 38 Once the intercounty commission has won acceptance, then
it could assume other area-wide services. This growth would be best accomplished under one comprehensive legislative enactment, authorizing in advance the acquisition of certain enumerated functions," st subject to a
popular vote or consent of most local governments. 3 8 In this way voters
would be called upon to vote on the transfer of individual functions and
could see the anticipated service improvements in better perspective. With
such an approach the growth of metropolitan government could be
gradual. Moreover, this expansion would be orderly and integrated since

132. A "home rule" amendment for Dade County was passed in the general election
of November, 1956, and the local voters in May of 1957 approved by a narrow margin a
charter for metropolitan government. This charter purported to authorize the performance
of certain area-wide functions by the county while leaving various city governments to

operate on a purely local level. However, the exact distribution of powers between city and
county has been a source of controversy.

133. In 1948 and 1953 Dade County voters rejected consolidation schemes which,
among other things, called for merger of Miami's government with that of the county.
134. If the plan had required a majority outside of Miami as well as within Miami,
it would have failed.
135. E.g., the voters of the Seattle area on March 11, 1958, rejected a multifunctional
special district of broad scope, the city voters approving-and the suburbs disapproving.
136. E.g., the Seattle area voters recently accepted a scaled-down multifunctional
special district. Among supporters of this new plan were opponents of the proposal defeated
in March, 1958. 47 NAT'L MmIC. REV. 465 (1958).
137. Among those states authorizing the formation of multifunctional metropolitan
districts by general law are: California: CAL. PUB. UTIL. COD. §§ 11501-14509 (1951);
Colorado: CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 89, art. 3 (1953); Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 7-333 to 7-339 (1958); Michigan: MiC.
Comp. LAws ch. 119 (1948);
Washington: VAsH. REV. CoDi. eh. 35.58 (Stpp. 1957).
138. The Washington legislation on "Metropolitan Municipal Corporations" allows
for the use of either method. \VASI. REv. 'CODE §§ 35.58.100, 35.58.110 (Supp. 1957).
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it would be accomplished by the same governmental unit rather than by
a variety of single-function special districts. 139
Unfortunately, the function approach has one big drawback, bureaucratic inertia. The sad fact is that established metropolitan districts have
shown little inclination to take over additional duties.' 40 In fact, district
governing bodies have often lost policy-making control over their own
functions and have seldom displayed leadership toward broader metropolitan govemment. 14 ' However, it may be, as some have said, that the
multifunctional district has never really been tested and that despair over
its future usefulness is premature. 142 There is much to be said for the latter
opinion because there are few metropolitan special districts which have
been created with the explicit aim -of some day providing a genuine
metropolis-wide government. Only time will tell if the more optimistic
view is justified.
The second political obstacle in the formation of any intercounty
metropolitan district will undoubtedly be the suspicion and hostility of
local politicians." 3 In the past local politicians have often looked upon
limited-function special districts with some favor since they have provided
stop-gap solutions to functional problems as well as escape from constitutional debt limitations. City politicians have also been interested in the
patronage potential of special districts144 (many of these units are independent of civil service), and suburban politicians have been favorable to
any metropolitan plan which stopped short of annexation to the central
city or intereference with local autonomy."45 However, there is good reason
to believe that local politicians might be less enthusiastic about a multipurpose intercounty metropolitan government with great potential for
139. In the St. Louis area the voters rejected the formation of a Metropolitan Transit
District in 1955. One of the arguments used against this new district was that it was
being formed independently of the Metropolitan Sewer District (both these districts were
only for the St. Louis side of the river) which had-authority to add new functions.
BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GovERNMEN'rs IN TIE UNITED STATES 65

(University of

California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957).
140. Id. at 68. The Port of New York Authority, for all the acclaim heaped upon it,
has not even brought all metropolitan transportation under its control. The Triborough
Bridge and Tunnel Authority and the New York City Transit Authority remain
independent. For a general treatment of integration in the New York area, see GULICK,
METROPOLIS IN

THE MAKING--ITnE

NEXT

TIlE NEw YORK METROPOLITAN REGION

TWENTY-FIVE

YEARS

IN GOVERNMENT

1N

66 (Regional Plan Inc., New York, 1955). The

East Bay Municipal Utility District (Oakland) has turned down requests that it assume
broader functions. BoLIENs, op. cit. sgura note 16, at 97, 100.
141. STUDENSKI, TlHE GOVERNIENT OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 337-39 (National
Municipal League, New York, 1930).
142. Fuchs, supra note 15, at 71.
143. For a general treatment of political and other non-legal obstacles to metropolitan
government, see Moak, Some Practical Obstacles in Modifying Governmental Structure

to Meet Metropolitan Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1957).

144. The Chicago Sanitary District (now called the Metropolitan Sanitary District

of Greater Chicago) was a rich source 9f political patronage until political scandals
prompted reform. V. JONES, op. cit. suprra note 14, at 96.
145. Id. at 92.
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future growth, particularly where this growth would greatly affect the power
and prestige of existing local governments. Therefore it might well behoove
proponents of an intercounty metropolitan district to win over this small
but powerful bloc.
City and county politicians are invariably the main champions of local
autonomy against state interference. Fearful of changes in the status quo,
local politicians have also raised the local autonomy issue against metropolitan government. Their anti-metropolitan attitude is usually shaped by
the fact that their own local government will diminish in power and
importance or that their own political power and prestige will decrease.
To win their support or at least moderate their opposition, it is necessary
to give them some stake in metropolitan government. On the basis of
recently passed statutes it seems that intercounty commissions will be
put together on a federal basis with membership being chosen from and
by local governing bodies and mayors rather than by direct popular vote. 146
Although this may seem an extreme concession to localism, it is the only
feasible system for an intercounty metropolis with a number of local
governments. 1 7 Moreover, the experience under the federal system in
Toronto has indicated that representatives of localities soon shed their
parochialism for a broader view. 1 " Apparently this is the best method
of winning local officeholders to the cause of metropolitanism.
It might be said that the lack of direct democratic control would be
enough to dani a system dominated by ex-officio office-holders. However,
a system in which the voters had to directly elect a whole slate of supracounty
officers in addition to city, county, state and federal officials would be so
complex that democratic control would be ineffective, if not illusory. The
solution would seem to be a compromise in which voters could directly
elect a chairman or executive to preside over a metropolitan commission
composed of local officeholders."1 9 This might prove to be an arrangement
which could preserve democratic values and provide metropolitan leadership
without unduly offending the champions of localism. In any event, no
system of intercounty metropolitan government can afford to ignore the
146. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.03 (West, Supp. 1959); WASH. Ruv. ConE
§ 35.58.120 (Supp. 1957). The \Vashington law also illustrates how this federal system

can be adapted to population differences so as to allow the larger local units greater
representation.
147. J. C. 'Bollens has stated the opinion that a federal type ex-officio governing body
for a special district is the best solution to the problem of cross-representation caused by
overlapping units of local government. BOLLENS, OP. Cit. sutPra note 16, at 124-25.
148. Milner, supra note 42, at 579.
149. One of the major criticisms of county government has been its lack of strong
leadership. To compensate for this a few counties now permit the election of a county
executive (e.g., Nassau and Westchester counties in New York). The Washington
legislature has attempted to achieve such metropolitan leadership by providing for a
chairman selected by the other members of the governing body from outside their own
number and from outside the ranks of public office-holders. XWVsn. Ri'v. CODE § 35.58.120

(Supp. 1957).
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possible hostility of local politicos or the petty antagonisms which exist
within any large metropolitan area." 0
The final political barrier to the creation of an intercounty metropolitan
district is the problem of concurrent voting majorities. Perhaps out of
deference to local antonomy, state legislatures have often required that a
plan of metropolitan government be approved by two or more different
political subdivisions within a metropolitan area. Quite often two majorities
have been called for, one within the central city and one without.1 ' In
such cases the suburban voters have shown a strong tendency to reject
metropolitan government. 152 Other plans have required more than two
majorities, 153 with Ohio having carried the concurrent majority requirement
to ridiculous extremes. 54 The plain fact is that it is hard enough to get
one area-wide majority without requiring a whole string of separate majorities, and any strategy for establishing an intercounty metropolitan district
should be based on keeping down the number of needed majorities.
CONCLUSION

It seems quite certain that many legislatures will sooner or later follow
the examples provided in California, Colorado, Michigan, Connecticut and
Washington and permit the creation of multifunctional special districts
adaptable to the intercounty metropolis. 15 5 The Washington legislation is
the most comprehensive and probably offers the best model to other states. 116
At any rate state legislatures cannot long avoid the necessity of providing
intercounty metropolitan government, and as this trend becomes more
pronounced, there may be an increased public consciousness of the ties

150. This antagonism is greatly accentuated where different political parties are in
control of various sections of a metropolis. Moak, supra note 143, at 609-610.
151. E.g., TENN.

CODE

ANN.

§

6-3709 .(Supp. 1959); XVAsI.

REv. CODE

§

35.58.090

(Supp. 1957). The St. Louis area has used the two-majority system in three separate
elections on metropolitan plans.
152. E.g., county voters in St. Louis have voted down two out of three metropolitan
plans, and in 1958 suburban voters in Seattle turned down a metropolitan plan. Recently,
the proposed consolidation of Nashville, Tennessee, with Davidson County was rejected
due to a heavy adverse vote outside of Nashville.
153. E.g., the unsuccessful plan for Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) in 1929, the
Newport News--Warwick County-Elizabeth City County consolidation proposal of
1950 (only two of the five needed majorities were obtained), the 1950 proposal to
transfer municipal-type powers to Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) (none of the four
needed majorities was obtained).
154. Art. X of the Ohio Constitution allows for a variety of approaches to metropolitan
government through county rejuvenation, but the good effect of these provisions is
nullified by an impossible requirement that a popular majority be obtained: (1) in the
county; (2) in the largest municipality; (3) in the county outside of the municipality; and
(4) in each of the majority of the combined total of municipalities and townships in the
county,
155. For citations on these districts, see note 137 supra.
156. See note 44 supra.
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which unite the citizens of a metropolis across city and county boundary
15 7
lines.
The boundaries of a metropolitan area bear no relation to arbitrary
political limits and are determined by the interaction between the citizens
of an urban area and its environs and the extent to which such interaction
extends. 15 8 Although the geographic extent of interaction may differ with
each function (e.g., air pollution control may involve a bigger area than
sewerage disposal), 55 political practicality dictates that there be but one
boundary for all the districts combined under an intercounty commission? 00
It is perhaps too much to hope that such an intercounty government will
attract the sentimental attachment which has been accorded to the city and
county,' 6 1 but it is certainly to be hoped that citizens of an intercounty
metropolis will have enough awareness of their mutual dependence to
support an intercounty metropolitan government and to develop some concept of metropolitan home rule.
It is further to be hoped that metropolitan leaders will develop a
concept of home rule which recognizes and allows for the continuing
territorial growth of metropolitan government.0 2 An intercounty metropolitan district must be able to grow, and it would be a shame if such
an entity were deprived of the geographic flexibility which is its crowning
virtue. Without the power to expand, a metropolitan special district would
soon become as territorially restricted as other methods of metropolitan
government. Only when it is possessed of power to extend its geographic
and functional scope can an intercounty metropolitan district truly lay
claim to being the best possible form of supracounty metropolitan government.

157. It has been suggested that the proper role of the state toward metropolitan
government should be to give a metropolitan area a push toward solution of its own
problems by cutting away legal obstacles and by encouraging metropolitan home rule.
V. JONES, op. cit. supra note 14, at 109-110.
158. For a sociological treatment of the factors which determine the extent of a
metropolis, see Reiss, The Community and the Corporate Area, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
443 (1957
159. 'Tie Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission (Boston) presides over
three metropolitan districts which differ in size.
160. Ralph Fuchs points out that if general taxation powers were granted to a
district, one boundary would be a necessity. Fuchs, supra note 15, at 76.
161. Studenski has pointed out that the word "district" has not attracted the loyalty

of the average citizen.

STUDENS!,

op. cit. supra note 141, at 338.

162. Unfortunately liberal annexation cowers have seldom been conferred on metropolitan special districts. For example, the initiative for annexation to most metropolitan
park districts lies with the voters of the territory to be annexed. See CAL. PN.
REsouRcEs Cor. § 5573; Oio Rtev. CODE § 1545.15 (Baldwin 1953), WAsH. REv.
CODE § 35.61.250 (1951).

